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ABSTRACT
The question of whether governments spend too much or too
little has been a frequent subject of debater but hasbeen
infrequentlyanalyzed.This paper proposes and then applies a
methodology which checks to see whether the "Samuelson conditionu fortheefficient provision of local public education is
satisfied, ie. whether the sum over the school district n-f
individua' marginalratesof substitution between public
education and a private numeraire equals the marqinalrate n-f technicalsubstitution between these two qoods. The econometric
methodology uses a micro—based approach to the estimation 0-f
marginalrate of substitution functions which accounts -for




















The question of whether governments spend too much or too little is a fine subject for popular
debate. We do not expect to displace this issue from the realm of rhetoric, but we think that there
are some feasible empirical tests that may suggest whether it is likely that any particular local
government is spending more or less than a Pareto optimal amount on a specified activity. We will
explain the theory behind one such test and apply it to the case of local school expenditures in
Michigan school districts.
The procedure is very simple in principle. We seek to check whether the standard "Samuelson
first order condition° (Samuelson, 1954) for efficient provision of public goods is satisfied. The
Samuelson condition requires that the sum over the community of individual marginal rates of sub-
stitution between a public good and a private numeraire equals the marginal rate of technical substi-
tution between these two goods. This condition is necessary for an interior Pareto optimum and in a
well-behaved convex economy is also sufficient.
Bowen (1943) proposed a model in which the amount spent on public goods is the median of the
quantities desired by voter-taxpayers, each of whom realizes that in return for the benefits of addi-
tional public expenditures, the burden will be predetermined share of the extra cost. Bowen showed
that If marginal rates of substitution are symmetrically distributed and all citizens have the same tax
shares, then majority rule leads to a Pareto efficient supply of public goods. Barlow (1970) suggests
that the Bowen condition is typically not satisfied and argues that, in the case of local schoolexpen-
ditures in Michigan, the median quantity demanded is less than Pareto optimal. Bergstrom (1979)
extends the domain of the Bowen efficiency theorem to more "realistic" cases.
It has been argued that voters systematically underestimate the benefits of public goods. Gal-
braith (1958) attributes this to the effect of private advertising. Downs (1960) argues that because
information is costly and a single voter has a negligible effect on public outcomes, it is rational for
voters to be less than fully informed about the effects of' public goods. This, Downs argues, leads to a
systematic underestimation of benefits, which are poorly understood. Others have suggested that
local governments supply too little public goods because there are "spillovers" in benefits from one
£
—1-city to another. These effects are analyzed by Brazer (1961), Weisbrod (1964) and Williams (1966).
Taking a somewhat different point of view, Romer and Rosenthal (1979), Brennan and Buchanan
(1971), Denzau and Mackay (1982), and others have suggested that bureaucrats may manipulate the
cho1ces offered to voters in such a way as to lead to greater expenditure than the median of the most
preferred amounts of voters. Shapiro and Sonstelie (1982) found some evidence to support the
hypothesis of bureaucratic manipulation, while Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979) suggested
that public employee market power might also lead to inefficient levels of public provision.'
Finally, the intermediate efficiency position is supported by Brueckner (1982) who suggests that
an efficient provision of public goods is likely to arise if communities maximize aggregate property
values. His empirical analysis of a sample of Massachusetts communities provides mild support for
that view.2
The tests that we consider are designed to test for undersupply of the kind suggested by Barlow
or oversupply due to bureaucratic manipulation. Since we deal with consumers' reported preferences
about expenditures in their own jurisdictions, we will not be able to detect undersupply or oversupply
that occurs because individuals do not know what is good for them. Our tests will also be unable to
discover whether there is undersupply because of unrewarded spillovers from one city to another.3
Furthermore, our results can tell us nothing about whether efficiency would require a different
assignment of people to cities. The tests are useful only for finding out whether the existing popula-
tion of a city could make a Pareto improvement for its members by increasing or decreasing its pub-
lic expenditures.
Section II outlines the methodological underpinnings of the theory. The description of the data
and empirical results appear in Section IlL Section IV contains some brief conclusions. Details con-
cerning the construction of some of our variables appear in the appendix.
1Seelnman(1980) f or an alternative theoretical approach and Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982) for some empirical evidence.
2 Bmeckner regresses aggregate property values on the level of public goods provision, arguing that a zero coefficient on the
public good variable is a necessary condition for efficiency. Brueckner assumes (restrictively) that individuals have identical
tastes, and that the allocation of land between residential and business use is fixed. The Brueckner test is, in addition, a test
for average efficiency among all jurisdictions, so that oversupply in one community can be balanced against undersupply in
another.
If the system of grants correctly accounts for these spillovers, then our test for intrajurisdictional efficiency can tell us
something about interjurisdictional efficiency as well.
-2-II. Methodology
Suppose that we observe a number of communities each of which supplies a single local public
good and that the public good can be purchased at constant cost in the "national" market. We choose
units of measurement so that the price of unit of public goods is one unit of private good. Each
citizen i of community 5hasa utility function of the form
ii.(Y1, A, H, Z3) (1)
Y is I 's disposable income (consumption of private good), A is the amount of the public good sup-
plied in 5,H.is a vector of personal characteristics of I (such as age, sex, family status, etc.) and
is a vector of characteristics of community 5(suchas its population, climate, proximity to other
cities). Consumer i's marginal rate of substitution between the public and private good will be a
function of the form
m =m(Y,A2,H,Z) (2)
The Samuelson condition for community 5isjust
Em1=1 (3)
If we knew the exact nature of the function m (), thevalue of Y1 and H for each of n citizens
in the community. the community characteristics Z2 and public goods supply A, then we could
check to see II' (3) was satisfied by direct substitution. Of course, we will have to settle for a statisti-
cal estimate of the function m ().
Inthe followig section, m () isestimated using a 1979 survey of Michigan households (see
Courant, Gramllch and Rubinfeld [1979]). With the estimated m () andcharacteristics of a school
district's population, the sum of marginal rates of substitution between public and private goods can
be computed for any district. It is important to realize that the estimates of the marginal rate of
substitution functions come from a statewide sample rather than just from those members of the
sample who live in the specific community for which we estimate the summed marginal rates. If all
of the observations came from a single community, we would not be able to identify a marginal rate
of substitution function, since there would be no variation in expenditure levels experienced by
respondents.
—3—Information about the number of individuals with various personal characteristics is available
from the census. However, information about the joint distribution of these characteristics with
income or with each other typically is not. Therefore, in order to estimate the sum or marginal rates
of substitution, we will have to make some restrictive assumptions about the functional form of in ().
Inparticular, we assume that individual marginal rate of substitution functions are of the form:
L K
m(.Y1, A, H, Z2) = fl0+ I31lnA+,lnY+E/331lnZ1 +Efl4kHk + (4)
1=1 k=i
This form was chosen not only because of its econometric convenience, but also because, as
Bergstrom and Comes (1983) have shown, a marginal rate of substitution function which is linear in
disposable in'come is sufficient for the Pareto efficient amount of public goods to be determined by
total income independently of other parameters of the income distribution. The stochastic term
is thought to be the unmeasured explanatory variables and it is distributed N (0, a) and is orthogonal
to the right-hand side explanatory variables.
From the Courant, Gramlich, Rubinfeld survey, we can calculate the respondent's tax price (t).
It would seem straightforward to estimate the parameters of (4) since the observed tax price would
be equated with the marginal rate of substitution. But, for various reasons, this optimization condi-
tion may not be met; for instance, public goods are complementary with private goods and community
choices with desired combinations of public and private goods may be limited, or alternatively,
households may simply misperceive or make mistakes.4 Since public goods choices are made with
error, the observed relationship is
t =m()—-v1 (5)
The random variable v represents the difference between the household's marginal rate of substitu-
tion and its tax price.
If v is uncorrelated with variables included in the mrs function, the mismatch between t and
m would cause no econometric problem. In such a case the least squares estimator of the parame-
ters of equation (4), using the tax price as a dependent variable, would be unbiased. If people sorted
In Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1982) we discuss some of the problems associated with the measurement of tax
price.
-4-themselves perfectly among communities and were able to equate their marginal rates of substitution
with their tax price, v1 would be zero for all 1. In this case of Tiebout-Lindahl equilibrium, a least
squares estimation procedure would be appropriate. However we do not know whether or not people
are able to equate t with m or more Importantly whether or not the error v1 is uncorrelated with the
right-hand variables in equation (4). It seems plausible that ability to match (the size of v1 )Is
related, for instance, to income and education, and perhaps the level of public good supplied -the
variables that affect the marginal rate of substitution.
If matching errors v depend on the same explanatory variables as does the marginal rate of'
substitution, the correct econometric specification is more complicated than a simple linear regres-
sion of tax price on the individual and community explanatory variables.
The central variable involves the survey questions which describe individual attitudes towards
education. They reveal whether individuals want expenditures to be more (M), the same (S), or less
(L). Unlike data on market Lehavior, from which purchases reveal the relationship between quanti-
ties consumed and marginal rates of substitution, the qualitative survey responses can only give an
approximation of the true value of the marginal rate of substitution. Economic theory tells us if
preferences are convex, a person wants greater spending if the mrs is greater than the tax price and
less spending if it is smaller than the tax price. We will show that the survey responses along with
substantial variations in tax price and expenditures, provide enough information to estimate the
parameters of the mrs equation (4).
The details of' the estimation technique are presented in two previous papers.5 Here we present
an outline of the estimation model for the case in which tax price is endogenous. Results for the
more complete case in which the level of public good expenditure as well as tax price is endogenous
are described briefly later.
In order to simplify the presentation, let ; =(inA, In Y1, in Z, H1) be the vector of right-
hand variables of the mrs equation. Equation (4)is rewritten
Bergstrom, Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1982) and Rubinfeld, Shapiro and Roberts (1986).
-5-m =X8 + (6)
Individual survey respondents answer more (M) if their mrs is sufficiently larger than their tax
price and less (L) If it Is sufficiently smaller. If there is an insufficient difference between mrsand
t, the answer is same (S). The concept of sufficient difference is formalized with a parameterS such





This simple model of response allows us to express the probability of any response conditional
on t and x as
P(MIt, z) =P(e> t —z+5)
P(Sjt,x)=P(t —x 5 et —fi'z —5) (7)
P(Ljt, z) =P(E< t —flx—5)
Since c N (O,o),theprobabilities can be expressed in terms of the standard normal cumulative den-
sity function F( )inthe following way:
t— z+S—E(clt,X)





t —'X—S—E (cJt ,X) P(14t,X)=F o(ctt,x)
Aslong asisdistributed independently of t and X, E(It,x)= 0.Maximum likelihood esti-
mation using these probability functions is then a straightforward problem, which yields consistent
and efficient estimators of the parameters and 5. However, because there is reason to suspect that
-6-, tand X are not independently distributed, the estimation is more complex. From equation (5)
and (6) we can write
=fl'X1+e,+v (9)
One way to express the possibility that v2 might depend on X is to make it a linear function of X in
the following way:
=x, 'Z + u (10)
In this formulation,is a vector of variables that explains the mismatch, but does not enter the
marginal rate of substitution function; and e is a random error uncorrelated with X and .The
random error u is assumed to be distributed N(0, ce).
The tax price equation is therefore
t =(fi+ ) + w (11)
where= +i.Becauseof the normality of e and u1, w1 N(0, oj.
Elsewhere (Rubinfeld, Shapiro and Roberts [1986]) we have proven that
E(clt,X)=X[t—( + ) X—]
where A is a parameter proportional to the covariance ofandw. Values of A significantly different
from zero indicate that sorting or matching is important, and that an alternative to least-squares
estimation is necessary.
Equations (8) and (11) constitute a system of simultaneous equations. The first set explains the
probability of response conditional on a particular tax price and the second explains the tax price in
relation to the determinants of the marginal rate of substitution and the systematic mismatch
between price and mrs. Under the distributional assumptions, the log-likelihood function is
1—A P—X9i >72 L=ElogF+ . — Xj—
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Thefirst three sums of equation (12) are the standard probit likelihood function, while the final
two terms are the equivalent of a standard linear regression of t on X1 and X2. If one were to esti-
mate the parameters of the mrs function with a simple regression of t on X1 and X2, the parame-
ters would not be the expected mrs parameters, fi,butthe sum of these and the matching parameters
'(seeLadd and Christopherson [1983]). On the other hand, if one were to use a probit estimation as
was done in Bergstrom, Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1982), the resulting estimators would generally be
inconsistent unless we have estimated the parameters by maximizing the full likelihood function
given in (12).
III. Testing for Efficiency in the Provision of Education
The first step in the efficiency test is to estimate the parameters of the likelihood function (12).
The data used to estimate these parameters was a subsample of 1093 homeowners from a survey of
Michigan voters residing in many different school districts. The amount of education provided in
each school district was obtained from the Michigan Department of Education; other community
characteristics were taken from the 1970 U.S. Census First Count and Fourth Count School District
data tapes. The definitions of all variables utilized in the estimation procedure are given in Table 1.
The mrs function is specified as linear in the logarithm of the continuous variables and a set of
relevant dummy variables. The explanatory variables were chosen first with respect to economic
theory which suggests that with convex preferences, the marginal rate of substitution will vary
-8-TABLE 1
Definition of Variables
PRICE: Individual's tax price
LNA: Log of actual per pupil educational expenditures
LNY: Log of household disposable income
BLACK: Dummy variable 1 If black 0 otherwise
AGE 1-5: Number of children younger than six years old
AGE 6-11: Number of children between 6 and 11
PRIVSCH: Dummy variable 1 If child in private school 0 otherwise
COLGRAD: Dummy variable 1 If a college graduate 0 otherwise
LTHS: Dummy variable 1 if did not graduate from high school 0 otherwise
FEMALE: Dummy variable 1 if female 0 otherwise
RETDA: Dummy variable 1 if retired or disabled 0 otherwise
AGE 65+: Dummy variable 1 If age over 65 0 otherwise
UNEMPL: Dummy variable 1 if unemployed 0 otherwise
TRANSFER: Dummy variable 1 If transfer payments received 0 otherwise
LNENRL: Log of total school district enrollment
LNPUP-B: Log of number of students per school
LNCOTEACH: Log of county average teachers salary
LNCY: Log of number of students per school
LNCW: Log of county average wage rate
YDIST: Fraction of households with income within 30 percent of median (YDIST is
thought of as a measure of population homogeneity)
CCITY: Dummy variable 1 if in central cIty 0 otherwise
SMSA: Dummy variable 1 if In SMSA 0 otherwise
-9-Inversely with the level of expenditures (A) and directly with the disposable income (Y). The remain-
lug variables were Included either because they might reasonably affect underlying preferences or
because they might affect the real price of education.
Race (BLACK) is one of the variables intended to account for differences in preference. The
only division we used here was between Black and Non-Black. A respondent with children (Ages 1-5
and Ages 6-11) could reasonably be expected to have a higher desired expenditure level than a similar
respondent without children. Conversely, a respondent with a child in a private school (FRIVSCH)
could be expected to have a smaller desired expenditure. The dummy variables for education of the
respondent were included as indicators of taste. Educated (COLGRAD) people can reasonably be
expected to have stronger preferences for education than uneducated ones (LTHS). We had no
expectation about how gender (FEMALE), retirement (RETDA), employment status (UNEMPL), wel-
fare status (TRANSFER) or age (AGE65+) affect taste for public education.
The continuous variables were included as descriptors of the school district in order to account
for differences in quality per unit of expenditure. School district size (LNENRL) and average school
size (LNPUP-B) were used to account for potential economies or diseconomies of scale at the level of
the school district and the individual schools. The average teacher's salary (LNCOTEACH) gives a
measure of the amount of teachers' services that can be purchased per dollar of expenditure. The
higher the salary, the lower the number of hours of teacher's time that can be purchased. However,
salaries might also be an index of teacher quality and in equilibrium interjurisdictional wage
difference makes no difference to the unit of educational quality per dollar of expenditure. The vari-
ables average income (LNCY) and wage rates (LNCW) are included to account for cost of living
difference between jurisdictions. We might reasonably expect that income affects demand for pro-
ducts and the wage rate the supply. The higher these are, the higher prices of all goods are likely to
be.
Three additional variables are chosen as explanatory values for v, the mismatch between tax
price and marginal rate of substitution; as an identifying restriction the additional variables are





Variables 1 Variables 2
e/constant 8.152
M (4.219)





/LNA -1.118 /LNA -0.419
(0.597) (0.136)
/LNY 0.413 /LNY 0.152
(0.180) (0.026)
/BLACK 1.206 /BLACK 0.050
(0.190) (0.080)
/AGE 1-5 0.126 /AGE 1-5 -0.037
(0.073) (0.026)
/AGE 6-11 0.172 /AGE 6-11 0.016
(0.057) (0.024)
/PFtIVSCH -0.190 /PRIVSCH 0.C38
(0.150) (0.064)
/COLGRAD 0.337 /COLGRAD 0.110
(0.155) (0.046)
/LTHS -2.116 /LTHS -0.023
(0.100) (0.044)
/FEMALE 0.135 /FEMALE 0.005
(0.725) (0.033)
/RETDA -0.353 /RETDA 0.063
(0.148) (0.059)
/AGE 65+ 0.138 /AGE 65+ -0.002
(0.141) (0.064)
/UNEMF'L -0.258 /UNEMPL 0.046
(0.232) (0.103)
/TRANSFER -0.422 /TRANSFER -0.130
(0.283) (0.108)
/LNENRL -0.158 /LNENRL -0.040
(0.065) (0.026)
/LNPUP-B 0.633 /LNPUP- 0.233
(0.290) (0.062)
/DETROIT -0.334 /DETRO1T -0.150
(0.313) (0.108)
/LNCOTEACH 0.988 /LNCOTEACH 0.103
(0.749) (0.363)
—11—TABLE 2 (continued)
/LNCY 0.30 /LNCY 0.459
(1.035) (0.367)
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-13-disperson of income (YDIST). We expect that the more homogeneous the community,the closer will
be the match between desired and actual expenditures. Individual choice sets should also affectthe
ability to achieve the optimailty condition. In urban areas (CCITY and SMSA),where there are
many jurisdictions, individuals have more choices in the mixof tax prices and expenditures than in
rural areas with Fewer jurisdictions.
The maximum likelihood coefficients and the standard errors associated with the specification
just described are given in Table 2. Each of the coefficients in column 1 representsthe ratio of the
marginal rate of substitution parameters (fi
-
s)to the conditional standard deviation ( ). The con-
sistent estimators of fi are found as the ratio of the coefficient of the explanatory variables to the
coefficient of PRICE. These values are given in column 1 of Table 3. The coefficient of particular
interest is the estimate of X /c .Witha t value of 1.68, the coefficient is significantly different from
zero at a 10 percent level of significance. It appears that sorting of people by their preferencesfor
public education can cause the coefficients of a simple probit maximum likelihoodestimation to be
biased.6 Of the three variables hypothesized to affect the matching of t and mrs. YDIST, CCITY and
SMSA, only the first is significantly different from zero.
The mrs parameters,s are found by dividing the coefficients in column (1) by the coefficient
1
on PRICE which itself is an estimate of i—. The coefficients as reported in column (1) reflectthe
effect of the listed variable on the probability of a more (M) response to the survey. For instance,
the negative coefficient on LNA indicates that the larger the actual level of spending, the lower the
probability of an M response. Similarly, the positive coefficient on LNY indicates that the higherthe
respondent's income, the more likely was an M response.







6Whetherthis sourceof bias will affect our efficiency test is a separate question,
—14—M Lo +o Constant ==
2(.)
where the'indicates maximum likelihood estimator. All the remaining fls are calculated as the
ratio of (flfo) to (1/7) from column (1) in Table 2. The estimated value of the mismatchparame-
ters (s)are calculated as the difference between the estimated values of (jI +7)given in column
(2) of Table 2 and the estimated values of figivenin column (1) of Table 3. The resulting estimates
are given in Table 3, column (2).
Computing the estimated values of the community marginal rates of substitution follows in a
straight-forward way from equation (4). Replacing the fl's in (4) with their estimated values and
summing (4) over all individuals in community jyields
N L N NK
E m(Y1, A, H,. Z,) = N(b1lnA+E31lnZ21) +'2E mY1 +E E 14kHjk(14) i=1 1=1 i=1 i=lk=1
The variables A3 and Z2, which are the level of educational expenditureper pupil and other charac-
teristics of community j,canbe found in published sources. The components of the vector Hk are
zero-one variables specifying whether an individual is a homeowner, older than 65, non-white, etc.
Therefore, the sum of these vectors is simply the vector whose components are the number ofper-
sons in a community with the corresponding characteristics.
For the actual calculations, we computed the community mean mrs and multiplied itby the
population size. By the linearity of the mrs specification, equation (6), this computation is
M
== n=n(') (15)
whereis the estimate of' the mean value of mrs andis a vector of the average values of the
explanatory variables z.
Our estimating equation is based on household income and tax price, and our estimates of mar-
ginal rates of substitution use Census data on family income and income of unrelated individuals in a
school district. In order to construct a community mrs from family and individual data, we found the
mean family mrs and the mean individual mrs and multiplied them by the number of families and the
-15-number of unrelated individuals respectively. The sum of these products is theestimated community
mrs.
In the process of matching the census data to the needs of the model we confronted anaddi-
tional difficulty with the income variable --thedistinction between families and individuals. The dis-
tribution of families in a school district was given for fifteen income brackets, allowing us toesti-
mate median family income (we assumed a uniform distribution within each bracket). Assuming
income is distributed log-normally,
F F . F
mean(Ln Y )= medtan(LnY )= log(medzanY )
Sincethe only data available for unrelated individuals were aggregate income and the number ofindi-
viduals, we took Ln (mean(Y' ))asan approximation for mean (Ln(Y')). Other census data are not
broken down into families and individuals but are given for the community as a whole. Assumingall
children live in families, we let
AGE 1—5= 0
AGE 15F =(# childrenage 0—5)/(#families)
and similarly for AGE 6-11 and PRIVSCH. Alltheother demographic characteristics were assumed
to be evenly distributed across families and individuals, e.g., COLGRAD =(# college
grads)/(population 18+).
The distribution of the computed values of community mrs, ,i,,isshown in Figure 1. The
average values for 576 Michigan school districts is 0.971 with astandard deviation of 0.276 and a
range among individual school districts of 0.276 and 2.881. The apparentconclusion is that, on aver-
age, these communities supply very close to the efficient level ofeducational expenditures. However,
this conclusion must be viewed as tentative for a number of important reasons. First, the standard
deviation is sufficiently large so that we cannot rule out the possibility of either under- or oversupply
of public education with substantial certainty. Second, the results are somewhat sensitive to the
method of estimation and the specification of the relevant equations.
It is interesting to note that when the single equation maximization method is applied, the mean
value of the community mrs's is .95 with a standard deviation of .28. While correction for the
-16-SUMMED MARGINAL RATES OF SUBSTITUTION:










0 0.5 I 2 2.5endogeneity of tax-price does alter the estimates of the structural parameters substantially, it does
little to our efficiency calculations.
We tried a number of alternative specifications for the simultaneous maximization approach,
concentrating on the choice of instruments for the matching equation. We were concerned with the
fact that the theory of sorting suggests the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between mismatch
and the instruments, since the absolute value of v is more important than its numerical value. To
allow for the possibility of this nonlinearity we interacted the more, same, and less responses with
each instrument (and kept the original instruments). Our calculated sum of the community mrs's fell
to .92.
Since the true marginal rate of transformation between public and private goods is equal to one,
a test for social efficiency involves a test of the null hypothesis thatis equal to 1. However, the
cost of education from the viewpoint of the school district may be less than 1 due to grants, commer-
cial and industrial tax base, and more generally the prospect of tax exporting.
For instance, the cost of public services is likely to be less than one in many school districts,
since some of the tax base is commercial and industrial property. The argument that some taxes can
be exported has been tested empirically by Ladd (1975), who estimated that roughly 50 percent of the
industrial base and 79 percent of the commercial base was available to lower the effective cost of
public services. Other explanations of the deviation of mrs from one are possible as well, including
the prospect of matching grants. However, during 1970, when the Census data were collected, all
state grants to education were non-matching, and thus inframarginal. State grants have not been
incorporated into this part of the analysis.8
Rather than posit an arbitrary estimate for the reduction of price due to the
commercial/industrial base, we attempted to estimate the effect. We assumed that communities can
export a portion, tz, of their non-residential property tax base. Letting pnr2 be the percent of non-
We also contemplated the possibility that both tax-price and school expenditure could be endogenous variables. En-
dogeneity of the expenditure variable can alter the calculations substantially because the expenditure coefficient appears in the
denominator of the various ratios that are used to calculate the estimates of the structural parameters. When we reestimated
and reevaluated our results with endogenous expenditures (as well as tax-price) we obtain a community sum of mrs's of 1.21.
At the time of the survey matching grants were available but not perceived to affect tax price. See Bergstrom, Rubinfeld,
and Shapiro (1982).
-18-residential property value in community j,thecommunity efficiency condition is
m = 1 —opnr3 (16)
We could use this equation to calculatebut our calculated valuesare measured with error.
Furthermore, the public choice process is likely to lead to additional errors within each community.
Therefore we postulate that the observed relationship to be
rn2 = 1 —pnr3+i (17)
where the random erroris N (,a,j.We allow for the possibility that community choices may
be biased by the possibility of a non-zero mean. We also assume thatu is independent of the expla-
natory variables --acrucial assumption here. The regression results are
= 1.121 —0.430pnr3 R2 = 0.127 (18)
(0.021) (0.054)
This regression suggests that for every one percent non-residential tax base in a community. thesum
of the marginal rates of substitution should fall by 0.43 percentage points. If publicspending is
chosen optimally, this result indicates that communities can export 43percent of their non-
residential tax base.
A more complete description of the community variables that explain the differences inmargi-
nal rates of substitution is given in Table 5, using the data described in Table 4. The resultsare
from a regression using tasthe dependent variable. They indicate that the more homogeneous the
community (the larger the value of YDIST) the smaller the mrs. This is a curious result since an
average value of 0.97 indicates some overspending. The significant TSAL coefficient implies that
higher teachers' salaries lead to higher expenditures per pupil. Similarly the larger the fraction of
blacks and unrelated individuals, the higher educational expenditures. Apparentlypoor communities,
those with a large fraction of welfare recipients and unemployed, have a tendency to spend more than
the efficient amount.
The final coefficient on PCRES is particularly interesting, for it indicates how community mar-
ginal rates of substitution change when residential value as a proportion of the tax base increases. If
communities' educational expenditures are efficient, the coefficient of 0.31 indicates the amount of
non-residential tax base that is exported. If none is exported, then changing PCRES would not affect
-19—TABLE 4
Deflnition of Variablei
YDIST: Fraction of households with income within 30 percent of
median
pçOOC: Fraction of owner occupied residences
SMSA: Dummy variable for SMSA
TSAL: Average teacher's salary
PCBLACK:Fraction of population that is black
PC6SUP: Fraction of population at least 65
PCINDS: Fraction of population that are unrelated individuals
PUPILS: Number of pupils in the school district
PCCOL: Fraction of population with a college degree
PCHNDICP:Fraction of population with handicap
PCWELFAR.:Fraction of population receiving welfare
PCSOCSEC:Fraction of population receiving social security
RU: Unemployment rate
PCRES: Fraction of tax base that is residential (1-pnr)
-20-TABLE 5
Explaining the Community

































mrsand the coefficient would be zero. If the entire tax on non-residential property were exported,
then the coefficient would be one. In the 576 Michigan communities the average value of PCRES is
approximately 65 percent. Therefore, the estimated value of the coefficient suggests that school dis-
tricts act as if they can export approximately 11 percent (0.31x0.65) of their property tax.
lY. Summary
We have provided a micro-based test for efficiency in the provision of local public schooling
within school districts. Our results are generally consistent with the view that public education is
efficiently supplied in Michigan. In addition, using the assumption that school districts supply educa-
tion efficiently, we calculate that local residents bear approximately 90 percent of the local property
tax burden, while 10 percent is exported. Further research on the model specification and on the
relationship between educational expenditure and educational output would extend our work in useful
directions.
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